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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

COOPERATION OR COERCION?: WHY SELECTIVE WAIVER IS
NEEDED IN GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS
INTRODUCTION
In the wake of federal legislation and government crackdowns on white
collar crime and securities laws violations, the legal environment in which
attorney-client and work-product privileges are asserted is changing
dramatically.1 Internal investigations are commonplace in corporations today.2
Corporate scandals from Enron to WorldCom to Tyco and others have
prompted companies to call on the assistance of attorneys to conduct internal
investigations of alleged improprieties.3 In turn, prosecutors and regulators
have great discretion in deciding whether to bring charges against corporations
for wrongdoing,4 and they can place tremendous pressure on corporations to
cooperate with the government in order to receive favorable treatment.5
The government frequently requires companies to waive attorney-client
and work-product privileges and to turn over the results of their internal
investigations as a condition of leniency.6 For example, the current guidelines
from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) regarding criminal charges against
corporations “go out of their way to emphasize that a corporation’s willingness

1. Richard M. Strassberg & Sarah E. Walters, Is Selective Waiver of Privilege Viable?,
N.Y. L.J. (July 7, 2003); see also Robert S. Litt, Unsealing the Lawyer’s Lips: The Changing
Contours of Attorney-Client Privilege in an Era of Corporate Fraud, CRIM. LITIG. NEWSLETTER
(A.B.A. Section of Litig.: Comm. on Criminal Litig., Chicago, Ill.), at 6.
2. Strassberg & Walters, supra note 1.
3. Id; see Zach Dostart, Selective Disclosure: The Abrogation of the Attorney-Client
Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 723, 731 (2006) (recognizing that
most corporations will conduct internal investigations when faced with allegations of
wrongdoing); see also Litt, supra note 1, at 6 (“The downfall of Enron, WorldCom and other
companies, and the ensuing investigations, brought about a new focus on corporate governance
and the role of the company’s lawyer in the face of a possible fraud.”).
4. Strassberg & Walters, supra note 1. Incentives in sentencing guidelines provide federal
prosecutors with a blueprint for deciding when a company “should be indicted based in part on
the quality of the corporation’s cooperation with a government investigation.” David M. Zornow
& Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New World: The Death of Privilege in Corporate
Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 154 (2000).
5. Strassberg & Walters, supra note 1; Litt, supra note 1, at 6; see also Zornow & Krakaur,
supra note 4, at 147 (“[T]he client’s rights of confidentiality . . . are giving way to the
government’s powerful demands for the swift disclosure of all evidence relevant to its
investigations of corporate misconduct.”).
6. Strassberg & Walters, supra note 1; Litt, supra note 1, at 6.
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to waive both the attorney-client and work-product privileges with respect to
internal investigations is an important factor that prosecutors will weigh in
assessing whether a company has effectively cooperated and therefore should
be afforded any leniency.”7 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
also considers waiver of privileges in determining whether a corporation has
cooperated.8 In fact, the SEC goes even further than the DOJ in its policies.
Not only is cooperation a condition of leniency in most cases, but corporations
may also be penalized for a perceived lack of cooperation with SEC
investigations.9 This includes a corporation’s refusal to waive its privileges.10
Thus, the decision of whether to waive privilege is both difficult and
complicated.11 Corporations have incentives to waive privilege to gain
leniency, though revealing their wrongdoing may subject them to
punishment.12 Yet the consequences of waiver extend far beyond the limits of
a government investigation.13 Corporations have reason to fear that disclosure
of privileged information may result in a “full-scale waiver” as to future civil
litigants.14
It is a fair bet that any civil lawsuits that follow a government investigation are
sure to request the disclosure of any internal investigation, and if the privilege
no longer applies, the company may find itself handing over to civil plaintiffs a
15
virtual road map to assist them in their lawsuit.

Because of this, corporations as well as government agencies, are calling
for a doctrine of selective or limited waiver, which would allow companies to

7. Strassberg & Walters, supra note 1; see Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. Larry D.
Thompson to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Attorneys on Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/
cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm [hereinafter Thompson Memo]; Richard Ben-Veniste & Lee H.
Rubin, DOJ Reaffirms and Expands Aggressive Corporate Cooperation Guidelines, 18 LEGAL
BACKGROUNDER No. 11, 1 (Apr. 4, 2003) (noting that the Thompson Memo provides guidance to
prosecutors and defense attorneys concerning the guidelines that direct the Department when
deciding whether to bring charges against a company).
8. Litt, supra note 1, at 6; see Report of Investigation Pursuant to § 21(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency
Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44,969 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm [hereinafter Seaboard Report] (listing
several criteria that it considers in determining whether to reward self-reporting).
9. Michael H. Dore, A Matter of Fairness: The Need for a New Look at Selective Waiver in
SEC Investigations, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 761, 761 (2006).
10. Id.
11. Strassberg & Walters, supra note 1; Litt, supra note 1, at 7.
12. Litt, supra note 1, at 7.
13. See Strassberg & Walters, supra note 1; Litt, supra note 1, at 7.
14. Litt, supra note 1, at 7.
15. Strassberg & Walters, supra note 1.
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cooperate with the government without waiving privilege as to other parties.16
In fact, corporations are entering into confidentiality agreements with
government agencies which allow them to disclose privileged information to
the government without waiving privilege as to any third parties who might
later seek to discover such information.17 The United States Courts of Appeal
currently are split on whether corporations’ disclosure of privileged
information to the government waives privilege as to third-party civil litigants
and whether confidentiality agreements are effective to maintain privilege as to
these third parties.18
Part I of this Note will introduce the history of this circuit split, providing
holdings and rationales from every circuit that has issued a ruling on this
question. Part I will also address the law concerning the attorney-client and
work-product privileges and waivers of both privileges generally. Part II
critiques the various rulings of the courts and analyzes the policy rationale for
allowing a selective waiver in government investigations as well as the future
of such a doctrine. This Note concludes that confidentiality agreements
allowing a limited waiver for disclosures to government agencies should be
upheld for reasons of fairness and public policy concerns.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF PRIVILEGES AND CIRCUIT SPLIT ON SELECTIVE
WAIVER
A.

Attorney-Client Privilege

Attorney-client privilege is the oldest common law privilege for
confidential information.19 “Its purpose is to encourage full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice.”20 In the interests of justice, the privilege is necessary because
attorneys must be able to assist their clients “free from the consequences or the
apprehension of disclosure.”21

16. See id.
17. Nolan Mitchell, Preserving the Privilege: Codification of Selective Waiver and the
Limits of Federal Power Over State Courts, 86 B.U. L. REV. 691, 697 (2006).
18. Strassberg & Walters, supra note 1. As a result of the circuit split concerning
confidentiality agreements, corporations face a great deal of uncertainty about whether their
confidentiality agreements will be invalidated. Dore, supra note 9, at 762; Mitchell, supra note
17, at 697–98.
19. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
20. Id.
21. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888); see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87
(Edward W. Cleary, ed., 2d ed. 1972) (“The proposition is that the detriment to justice from a
power to shut off inquiry to pertinent facts in court, will be outweighed by the benefits to justice
(not to the client) from a franker disclosure in the lawyer’s office.”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1294

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:1291

Because the privilege effectively withholds material information from the
fact-finder, it is applicable only when necessary to accomplish its purpose.22
Attorney-client privilege is construed narrowly, and “protects only those
disclosures—necessary to obtain informed legal advice—which might not have
been made absent the privilege.”23 Confidentiality is the key factor of the
privilege, therefore if a party voluntarily discloses otherwise privileged
information to a third-party, he loses the protection of attorney-client
privilege.24 It has long been recognized that voluntary disclosure to a third
party is inconsistent with the privilege.25 “If clients themselves divulge such
information to third parties, chances are that they would also have divulged it
to their attorneys, even without the protection of the privilege. Thus, once a
client has revealed privileged information to a third party, the basic
justification for the privilege no longer applies . . . .”26
1. Selective Waiver Approved
The Eighth Circuit is the only circuit that has adopted selective waiver for
attorney-client privilege.27 In fact, it was the Eighth Circuit that developed the
notion of selective waiver in Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith in 1977. 28
In that case, when defending a civil action, Diversified claimed attorney-client
privilege for a memorandum and report prepared by its counsel that was
previously produced to the SEC in response to a subpoena by the agency.29
The court addressed the issue in a single paragraph, concluding that only a
limited waiver of privilege had occurred.30 It declared that “[t]o hold
otherwise may have the effect of thwarting the developing procedure of
corporations to employ independent outside counsel to investigate and advise
them in order to protect stockholders, potential stockholders and customers.”31

22. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
23. Id.
24. In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, 450 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir. 2006).
25. United States v. Bernard, 877 F.2d 1463, 1465 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. AT&T
Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
26. Comment, Stuffing the Rabbit Back into the Hat: Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client
Privilege in an Administrative Agency Investigation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1198, 1207 (1982).
However, courts have allowed disclosure to third parties where such disclosure still serves the
underlying purpose of the doctrine. See Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 184–85 (9th
Cir. 1965) (holding that clients may disclose information to co-defendants or co-litigants).
27. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1977).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 599.
30. Id. at 611.
31. Id.
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2. No Selective Waiver
The D.C. Circuit was the first circuit to consider selective waiver after
Diversified. In Permian Corporation v. United States,32 the Department of
Energy requested documents from the SEC which the SEC had previously
received from the corporation.33 The company had voluntarily turned over the
documents to the SEC in connection with an investigation involving possible
illegal bribes to foreign officials and tax fraud.34 Considering the purpose of
the attorney-client privilege, the court found the doctrine of selective waiver to
be “wholly unpersuasive.”35 The court decided that the availability of a limited
waiver would not serve the interests underlying attorney-client privilege.36 It
determined that although “[v]oluntary cooperation with government
investigations may be a laudable activity,” it is hard to comprehend how this
improves the attorney-client privilege.37 It concluded that “[i]f the client feels
the need to keep his communications with his attorney confidential, he is free
to do so under the traditional rule by consistently asserting the privilege, even
when the discovery request comes from a ‘friendly’ agency.”38
The court also held that “[t]he client cannot be permitted to pick and
choose among his opponents, waiving the privilege for some and resurrecting
the claim of confidentiality to obstruct others, or to invoke the privilege as to
communications whose confidentiality he has already compromised for his
own benefit.”39 It determined that attorney-client privilege should only be
available to a client who wants to maintain genuine confidentiality.40 It
concluded that the corporation destroyed the confidentiality of its attorneyclient communications when it disclosed them to the SEC.41 The First,
Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits have also rejected selective waiver for
attorney-client privilege, using reasoning similar to that in Permian.42

32. 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
33. Id. at 1216–17.
34. Id. at 1216.
35. Id. at 1220.
36. Id.
37. Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1222.
41. Id. at 1219; see also In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1370 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (reiterating the Circuit’s position and holding that the privilege should only be available for
a litigant who wants to maintain genuine confidentiality).
42. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1425 (3d Cir.
1991) (holding that selective waiver does not further the interest of attorney-client privilege; it
merely promotes voluntary disclosure to the government, which extends the privilege beyond its
intended purpose); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Pollard, 856 F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1988) (rejecting
a limited waiver of attorney-client privilege where a corporation had previously disclosed
documents to the government in an effort to settle a criminal investigation against it); John Doe
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In 2002, the Sixth Circuit issued a comprehensive opinion on the issue in
In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation Billing Practices Litigation.43
In that case, civil plaintiffs sought documents that the corporation previously
provided to the DOJ and other government agencies.44 The court rejected the
doctrine of selective waiver in any form.45 It held that the approach adopted in
Diversified had little, if any, connection “to fostering frank communication
between a client and his . . . attorney.”46 The court concluded that all forms of
selective waiver, even those which stem from confidentiality agreements, alter
the attorney-client privilege into “merely another brush on an attorney’s
palette, utilized and manipulated to gain tactical or strategic advantage.”47 The
court admitted that a selective waiver rule would further the search for truth,
promote substantial investigative efficiencies, encourage settlements, and
potentially increase corporate self-policing.48 Thus, it recognized the appeal
and justification for permitting cooperation with the government, but
determined that the purpose of attorney-client privilege should not be thwarted
by imposition of selective waiver.49
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Boggs argued that because the harms of
selective disclosure are not clear, the benefits to the government of sharing
information should prevail.50 Judge Boggs concluded that the court’s choice is
not a decision whether to release privileged information to third party civil
litigants which was already disclosed to the government; rather the choice is
whether to create incentives that permit voluntary disclosures to the
government at all.51 He noted that “[i]n the run of cases, either the government
Corp. v. United States, 675 F.2d 482, 489 (2d Cir. 1982) (rejecting a “pick and choose” theory of
attorney-client privilege and expressly adopting the reasoning in Permian, while noting that the
case before it was somewhat stronger because it did not involve a confidentiality agreement with
the corporation and a government agency); see also United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129
F.3d 681, 686 (1st Cir. 1997). The First Circuit commented:
Anyone who chooses to disclose a privileged document to a third party, or does so
pursuant to a prior agreement or understanding, has an incentive to do so, whether for
gain or to avoid disadvantage. It would be perfectly possible to carve out some of those
disclosures and say that, although the disclosure itself is not necessary to foster attorneyclient communications, neither does it forfeit the privilege. With rare exceptions, courts
have been unwilling to start down this path—which has no logical terminus—and we join
in this reluctance.
Id.
43. 293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002).
44. Id. at 292–93.
45. Id. at 302.
46. Id.
47. Id. (quoting In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 1993).
48. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 293 F.3d at 303.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 311.
51. Id. at 312.
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gets the disclosure made palatable because of the exception, or neither the
government nor any private party becomes privy to the privileged material.”52
Judge Boggs asserted that there is great importance in allowing the government
increased access to privileged information that it otherwise would not be able
to secure.53 Thus, allowing a limited waiver to government agencies would
advance public interest by “bringing violations of the law to light.”54
Work-Product Privilege55
The purpose underlying the work-product doctrine is notably different
from that of attorney-client privilege.56 Whereas the goal of attorney-client
privilege is to protect the confidentiality of communications between an
attorney and a client, the work-product doctrine is designed to promote the
adversarial system by shielding information prepared by attorneys in
anticipation of litigation.57 The United States Supreme Court created this
doctrine in Hickman v. Taylor, determining that “it is essential that a lawyer
work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by
opposing parties and their counsel.”58 The court reiterated that it is important
for attorneys to act on behalf of their clients without worrying that their
adversaries will discover their tactics.59 As explained by one commentator:
B.

52. Id.
53. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 293 F.3d at 311.
54. Id. at 312–13.
55. This is not a true privilege because opponents can receive access to the information if the
requirements of the rule are met. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495
(1947).
56. Dostart, supra note 3, at 730 (“Although both the attorney-client privilege and the work
product doctrine are derived from common law, they have significant differences.”).
57. Dore, supra note 9, at 764; Mitchell, supra note 17, at 699–700. The doctrine was later
codified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which state that a party may discover materials
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that
other party's representative (including the other party's attorney, consultant, surety,
indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has
substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is
unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by
other means.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
58. 329 U.S. at 510. The Hickman Court further explained that the work product doctrine
permits an attorney to “assemble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the
irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and needless
interference.” Id. at 511.
59. Id. at 510–11; see Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 4, at 150 (“[W]ork product doctrine is
based on ‘the public policy underlying the orderly prosecution and defense of legal claims’—the
notion that, in an adversary system, an attorney should not be obliged to share her work with her
client’s adversary.”) (quoting Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510).
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The natural jealousy of the lawyer for the privacy of his file, and the courts’
desire to protect the effectiveness of the lawyer’s work as the manager of
litigation, have found expression, not only as we have seen in the evidential
privilege for confidential lawyer-client communications, but in rules and
60
practices about the various forms of pretrial discovery.

Because the purpose of this privilege differs from attorney-client privilege,
the waiver rules differ as well.61 The work-product doctrine is designed to
protect the adversarial system and is not concerned with a client’s ability to
receive confidential legal advice.62 Thus, a party does not automatically lose
the protection of the privilege by making a disclosure to a third- party.63 If,
however, the disclosure gives an adversary access to the information, most
courts hold that the protection of the privilege is waived.64
1. Selective Waiver Approved
The Fourth Circuit is the only circuit to approve selective waiver for the
work-product privilege.65 However, it has limited the use of selective waiver
to cases involving only opinion work product.66 The court held that the waiver
was comprehensive when the company made testimonial use of non-opinion
work product by disclosing it to the government.67 The court extended
selective waiver to opinion work product for two reasons.68 First, the court
concluded that opinion work product has received great protection by courts.69
It noted that “the plain language of [FED. R. CIV. P.] 26(b)(3) suggests especial
protection for opinion work product[.]”70 Second, the Court determined that in
a trial, there is little risk that a party “will attempt to use a pure mental
impression or legal theory as a sword and as a shield . . . so as to distort the
factfinding process.”71 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district
court’s ruling concerning work-product protection.72

60. The Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine in Federal
Criminal Investigations, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 307, 313 (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 96
(Edward W. Cleary, ed., 2d ed. 1972)).
61. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1428 (3d Cir. 1991).
62. Mitchell, supra note 17, at 700.
63. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1428.
64. Id.; see also 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2024 (1994).
65. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Pollard, 856 F.2d 619, 626–27 (4th Cir. 1988).
66. Id. at 626.
67. Id. at 625.
68. Id. at 626.
69. Id.
70. Martin Marietta Corp, 856 F.2d at 626.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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2. No Selective Waiver
Ironically, the circuit that created the concept of selective waiver and
applied it to attorney-client privilege, has rejected the doctrine in the workproduct arena.73 In Chrysler Motors, a company produced a computer tape to
its adversaries in civil litigation during settlement negotiations under a
confidentiality agreement.74 The U.S. Attorney later sought production of
these tapes, and the company refused to produce them.75 The Eighth Circuit
held that “Chrysler waived any work-product protection by voluntarily
disclosing the computer tape to its adversaries . . . .”76 It also held that the
company’s confidentiality agreement was irrelevant, because the determinative
factor was that the materials were not kept confidential.77
Focusing on the purpose of privilege, the Third Circuit ruled that workproduct privilege may be retained when disclosure furthers the interests
underlying the doctrine.78 However, the court noted:
[w]hen a party discloses protected materials to a government agency
investigating allegations against it, it uses those materials to forestall
prosecution (if the charges are unfounded) or to obtain lenient treatment (in the
case of well-founded allegations). These objectives, however rational, are
79
foreign to the objectives underlying the work product doctrine.

The court held that attorneys are free to prepare their cases without fearing
disclosure to their opponents as long as they and their clients refrain from
disclosing privileged materials themselves.80 Likewise, the Sixth Circuit held
that most of the rationale for disallowing selective waiver in the attorney-client
contexts extends to work product as well.81 Work product allows an attorney
to prepare his case in confidence.82 Thus, the goal underlying this doctrine
“has little to do with talking to the Government.”83
Finally, as noted above, the Fourth Circuit refused to apply selective
waiver to non-opinion work product, even though it did adopt selective waiver
for opinion work product.84 The First Circuit issued the same ruling as the

73. Chrysler Motors Corp. Overnight Evaluation Program Litig., 860 F.2d 844, 846 (8th
Cir. 1988). The Chrysler court did not discuss Diversified in reaching its decision to deny a
selective waiver.
74. Id. at 845.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 846.
77. Id.
78. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1429 (3d Cir. 1991).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare, 293 F.3d 289, 306 (6th Cir. 2002).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Pollard, 856 F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1988).
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Fourth regarding selective waiver and opinion work product, holding that “it
would take better reason than we have to depart from the prevailing rule that
disclosure to an adversary, real or potential, forfeits work product
protection.”85
3. Case-by-Case Approach to Selective Waiver
In In re Sealed Case, the D.C. Circuit held that documents that the
company had previously produced to the SEC were not protected work
product.86 There, the record did not establish that the company entered into a
confidentiality agreement with the SEC.87 The court determined that any
governmental agency has the power to expressly agree to any disclosure
limitations to other agencies, as long as it does not violate their duties under
the law.88 However, it held that courts should not imply an agreement where
the parties did not expressly make such an agreement.89
Applying In re Sealed Case, the D.C. Circuit rejected another claim of
selective waiver for work product in In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum.90
However, the court did not reject the selective waiver doctrine under all
circumstances.91 It limited its rejection to the circumstances of that case.92 Its
decision was based on three factors: (1) the proposed use of work-product
protection was not consistent with the purpose of the doctrine; (2) the
appellants did not have a rational basis for believing that the SEC would keep
the disclosed documents confidential; and (3) applying waiver “would not
trench on any policy elements now inherent in this [protection].”93 The court
noted that the company chose to participate in the SEC’s voluntary disclosure
program.94 It concluded that this decision was obviously motivated by selfinterest.95 The appellants wanted to claim work-product protection for the
same disclosures against different adversaries in suits based on the very same
matters disclosed to the SEC.96 The court held that “[i]t would be inconsistent
and unfair to allow appellants to select according to their own self-interest to
which adversaries they will allow access to the materials.”97 The court

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

United States v. Mass. Inst. Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 687 (1st Cir. 1997).
676 F.2d 793, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Id. at 820.
Id. at 824.
Id.
738 F.2d 1367, 1371–72 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1372.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Subpoenas, 738 F.2d at 1372.
Id.
Id.
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reiterated that the company failed to ensure by agreement that the SEC would
not disclose the materials.98
Likewise, in In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., the Second Circuit denied
mandamus relief to defendants alleging work-product protection for a
memorandum previously disclosed to the SEC.99 However, in denying the
petition, the court refused “to adopt a per se rule that all voluntary disclosures
to the government waive work product protection.”100 The court held that the
issue should be decided on a case-by-case basis.101 It noted that a per se rule
“would fail to anticipate situations . . . in which the SEC and the disclosing
party have entered into an explicit agreement that the SEC will maintain the
confidentiality of the disclosed materials.”102
C. Other Notable Cases
In one of the most illustrative state court opinions on the issue, the
Delaware Court of Chancery upheld selective waiver for attorney-client
privileged communication.103 In Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., a shareholder
requested documents that McKesson previously disclosed to the SEC pursuant
to a confidentiality agreement.104 The court concluded that when companies
disclose privileged information after securing a confidentiality agreement, they
gain a heightened expectation of privacy.105 The court expressly responded to
the Sixth Circuit’s fairness argument by asserting that third-party litigants are
not disadvantaged with a waiver rule.106 It asserted that civil litigants are in no
worse position than had disclosure never been made.107 The court also noted
that a selective waiver rule would encourage corporate compliance and benefit
law enforcement.108
In a subsequent and related case, the District Court for the Northern
District of California followed the Delaware Court ruling and upheld selective
waiver for work product in In re McKesson HBOC, Inc.109 The court relied
substantially on Judge Boggs’s dissent in In re Columbia/HCA in reaching its
decision.110 In issuing its ruling, the court emphasized the distinction between

98. Id. at 1375.
99. 9 F.3d 230, 232 (2d Cir. 1993).
100. Id. at 236.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. 18553, 2002 WL 31657622, at *11 (Del. Ch. Nov.
13, 2002), aff’d, No. 18554, 2005 WL 583742 (Del. Mar. 8, 2005).
104. Id. at *1.
105. Id. at *6.
106. Id. at *9–10.
107. Id.
108. Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8.
109. No. 99-CV-20743, 2005 WL 934331, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2005).
110. Id. at *9.
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disclosure to private parties and disclosure to a government agency pursuant to
a confidentiality agreement.111 It concluded that in the former case a waiver
would clearly result, while the privilege should be upheld in the latter case.112
D. Tenth Circuit Issues Overall Refusal of Selective Waiver
In the most recent selective waiver case, the Tenth Circuit issued a
comprehensive opinion rejecting selective waiver under all circumstances.113
In a consolidated securities class action against Qwest, the lead plaintiffs
requested pretrial production of documents.114 Qwest claimed that the
documents were protected by the attorney-client and work-product
privileges.115 These documents were previously produced to the SEC and DOJ
pursuant to subpoena and confidentiality agreements between Qwest and the
agencies during an investigation of the corporation’s business practices.116 The
agreements provided that Qwest did not intend to waive attorney-client
privilege or work-product privilege as to the documents, and the SEC and DOJ
agreed not to disclose the documents to any third party unless the agencies
determined that disclosure was required by law and “would be in furtherance
of the [agencies’] discharge of its duties and responsibilities.”117 The court
held that the confidentiality agreements do not support an adoption of selective
waiver.118 The court reasoned that the agreements gave the agencies broad
discretion to use the disclosed documents as they saw fit.119
Qwest urged the court to adopt a “selective waiver,” which would allow
production of the privileged documents to the DOJ and SEC without waiving
the privilege as to third party civil litigants.120 Considering the purposes
behind the attorney-client and the work-product doctrine, the court refused to
adopt a selective waiver doctrine as an exception to the general waiver rules.121
The court also concluded that “[t]he record [did] not establish a need for a rule
of selective waiver to assure cooperation with law enforcement, to further the
purposes of the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine, or to avoid
unfairness to the disclosing party.”122 The court noted that what Qwest was

111. Id.
112. Id. The Court did not uphold the attorney-client privilege in this case because McKesson
agreed to disclose the information before any communications were even made to the attorneys.
Id. at *3.
113. In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2006).
114. Id. at 1182.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1181.
117. Id. (citing Pet’r Br., Ex. B at 1).
118. In re Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1194.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1181.
121. Id. at 1192.
122. Id.
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requesting was really a whole new privilege: a “government-investigation
privilege.”123 The court was unwilling to create this new privilege.124
The court did not accept Qwest’s argument that selective waiver is
necessary to ensure cooperation with law enforcement.125 It determined that
“companies will cease cooperating with law enforcement absent protection
under the selective waiver doctrine,” noting that Qwest turned over documents
in the face of almost unanimous rejection of the selective waiver by other
circuits.126 Also, the court noted that the agencies voiced no support for
Qwest’s position, pointing to the fact that the DOJ wrote a reply brief at the
court’s request and took no position on the issue of whether a selective waiver
should be found.127
The court reasoned that selective waiver does not promote the goals of the
attorney-client and work-product privileges.128 Selective waiver does not
promote exchange between the attorney and client, but it would have the
opposite effect of inhibiting communication.129 The court determined that
officers and employees would be guarded in the conversations with attorneys if
they knew that employers could disclose privileged information to the
government without risking further waiver of attorney-client privilege.130 The
court also noted that selective waiver does little to further the purpose of the
work-product doctrine, which is to enable counsel to prepare a case in
privacy.131 It found that selective waiver may encourage attorneys to prepare
cases with any eye towards pleasing the government.132
The court did not accept Qwest’s argument that disallowing selective
waiver would be unfair to them but not to the civil plaintiffs.133 It decided that
allowing Qwest to choose which of its adversaries would be privy to privileged
information is “far from a universally accepted perspective of fairness.”134 It
noted that Qwest realized an obvious benefit from disclosing the materials to
the government, “but did so while weighing the risk of waiver.”135
123. In re Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1192.
124. Id.; see also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1426 (3d
Cir. 1991) (also ruling that a new privilege was not necessary to encourage cooperation with the
government and noting that Westinghouse chose to cooperate despite the absence of an
established selective waiver privilege).
125. In re Qwest, 450 F.3d. at 1193.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1195.
129. Id.
130. In re Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1195.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1195–96.
134. Id. at 1196.
135. In re Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1196.
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III. SELECTIVE WAIVER SHOULD BE APPROVED
Although courts have distinguished between the purposes of attorneyclient privilege and work-product privilege, their reasoning for rejecting
selective waiver for both privileges has been relatively similar.136 The weight
of authority is clearly against selective waiver, and the courts’ decisions have
been predominately based on two factors: purpose of the privileges and
fairness.137 This section will analyze why the courts have reached the wrong
conclusion when addressing these factors and will argue that a selective waiver
should be adopted in government investigations when a confidentiality
agreement has been executed.
A.

Opposing Courts Reach Wrong Conclusion on Goals of Privileges
Courts rejecting selective waiver have come to the uniform conclusion that
the doctrine does not support the purposes of the attorney-client and workproduct privileges.138 However, these courts fail to recognize the exact impact
of selective waivers as well as the public policy arguments which override
their concerns.
As courts have reiterated, the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to
encourage “full and frank discussion between attorneys and their clients.”139
Courts have been firm in ruling that the selective waiver doctrine does not
advance this purpose, and the Tenth Circuit took it one step further by
determining that selective waiver actually inhibits the goal of the attorneyclient privilege.140 The Tenth Circuit concluded that employees would be
discouraged from talking to corporate attorneys if they knew that the attorneys
could disclose the contents of their conversations to the government without
risking further disclosure to other parties.141 This argument advanced by the
Tenth Circuit as well as other opponents of the doctrine is illogical and fails to
consider the full scope of selective waiver.
Courts opposing the doctrine have looked at selective waiver only as a tool
of manipulation for companies to employ whenever it benefits them. There is
no doubt that companies do use selective waiver to their advantage. However,
courts that oppose selective waiver refuse to recognize that the nature of the
doctrine itself actually encourages full and frank discussion between corporate
employees and attorneys. Given that corporate clients have a great incentive to

136. See supra text accompanying notes 19–135.
137. See id.
138. See id. But see In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare, 293 F.3d 289, 308 (6th Cir. 2002)
(Boggs, J., dissenting) (“It is not clear why an exception to the third-party waiver rule need be
moored to the justifications of the attorney-client privilege.”) (emphasis in original).
139. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); see supra text accompanying
note 21.
140. In re Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1195.
141. Id.
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cooperate with government investigations to ensure leniency for the
corporation, themselves, or both, selective waiver would encourage frank
discussion between corporate attorneys and clients if clients were assured that
their communications could not be disclosed to third parties who could later
sue them. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that employees would ever be
discouraged from talking to attorneys when it would clearly be to their
advantage to do so.
Although in vehement opposition with most court rulings on the issue, the
Eighth Circuit, the Delaware Court of Chancery, and the Northern District of
California were correct in determining that failure to adopt selective waiver
actually “hindered the corporate attorney’s role as advisor.”142 Specifically,
the Delaware court concluded that “[w]hen courts amplify the risk of
disclosure to include future private plaintiffs, the scales begin to tip further in
favor of corporate noncompliance with investigative agencies.”143 The courts
found that the goal of the privilege was furthered when companies were
assured that information disclosed to the government will not in turn be
disclosed to civil litigants.144
Additionally, courts ruling against selective waiver have concluded that the
doctrine does not further attorney-client privilege, but creates an exception for
communications between the government and corporations.145 These courts
have come to the wrong conclusion. Selective waiver does not promote full
and frank communication between the client and the government; it merely
allows privileged communications between clients and attorneys to be
disclosed to the government.146
Moreover, selective waiver can also promote the goal of the work-product
privilege. As noted above, the purpose of this privilege is to ensure that
attorneys are allowed to prepare their cases in privacy, free from the intrusion
of their adversaries.147 In explaining the goal of the doctrine, courts have
articulated that attorneys should not be privy to the work of an adversary.148

142. Tiffany Seeman, Safeguarding the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Face of Federal
Securities Regulations, 4 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 309, 335–36 (2006).
143. Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. 18553, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8 (Del. Ch. Nov.
13, 2002), aff’d, No. 18554, 2005 WL 583742 (Del. Mar. 8, 2005).
144. Seeman, supra note 142, at 336.
145. Id. at 338; see, e.g., In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare, 293 F.3d 289, 302 (6th Cir. 2002)
(asserting that the privilege was not designed to protect communications between the client and
the government).
146. Seeman, supra note 142, at 338. This same logic can be applied to the work product
doctrine as well. Selective waiver does not encourage companies to prepare their cases for the
benefit of the government, but it merely allows them to disclose the information which they have
prepared in anticipation of litigation to the government.
147. See supra notes 56–64 and accompanying text.
148. See id.
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Without selective waiver, this is exactly what will happen. If courts allow
work-product privileged information to be turned over to third-party civil
litigants, these litigants would be provided with a blueprint for litigating
against the disclosing corporations.
Furthermore, while maintaining and promoting the goals of the substantive
privileges is laudable, courts have created exceptions for other legal doctrines
which did not support the goals of those doctrines, particularly when there
were public policy concerns involved. For example, in the contracts arena,
courts have created an exception to the general rule for advertisements.149
Normally, advertisements are not offers but are mere invitations to negotiate an
offer, unless there is a public policy reason to bind the advertiser.150 This
exception does not support the purpose of the substantive law regarding
advertisements, but exists solely because of issues of fairness and public policy
concerns. In the field of torts, there is no duty for an actor to rescue another
who has not been placed in harm by that actor’s conduct, even if the actor
should realize that his actions may be necessary to save another.151 However,
courts will impose an affirmative duty to act based solely on the relationship
between the actor and the individual in danger. For example, a parent may
have a duty to save a child and a husband may have a duty to save his wife.152
Like the contracts example, the exception does not promote the purpose of the
substantive privilege concerning a duty to act, but it exists solely for reasons of
public policy.
Additionally, within the selective waiver arena, several courts have
adopted selective waiver for public policy reasons. As noted above, the Fourth
Circuit has adopted selective waiver for opinion work product.153 The Second
Circuit and the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that approval of selective waiver
may be possible where the company has entered into a confidentiality
agreement with the government, such that the companies have a reasonable
expectation that their communications will be kept confidential.154 Finally, the
Eighth Circuit, the Delaware Court of Chancery, and the Northern District of
California have expressly adopted selective waiver for attorney-client
privilege.155 Therefore, it would not be unprecedented or unreasonable for

149. See, e.g., Leonard v. Pepsico, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Izadi v.
Machado Ford, Inc., 550 So. 2d 1135, 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
150. See e.g., Leonard, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 122–23; Izadi, 550 So. 2d at 1140; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26 (1979).
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1963).
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. A (1963).
153. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Pollard, 856 F.2d 619, 626 (4th Cir. 1988).
154. In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Subpoenas Duces
Tecum, 738 F.2d 1376, 1371–72 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
155. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978); In re McKesson
HBOC, Inc., No. 99-CV-20743, 2005 WL 934331, at *9–10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2005); Saito v.
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courts to approve an exception that would not promote the goal of the
substantive rule in this case.
B.

Fairness Weighs in Favor of Corporations
As noted earlier, due to the changing legal landscape concerning corporate
corruption, companies face ever increasing pressures to waive privilege and
cooperate with government investigations. One might argue that the decision
to waive privilege and disclose information to the government is simply the
corporation’s choice, and that the companies should live with the consequences
of their self-serving choice to cooperate with investigations against them.156
“But for men and women facing the threat of imprisonment, the effective end
of their professional careers and financial well-being, and the weight of lining
up against the United States Government, it is not much of a choice. In many
ways, cooperation must feel like the only option.”157 Unfortunately for the
corporations, the majority of courts have not been sympathetic to their plight.
Courts rejecting selective waiver have held that corporations cannot selectively
waive privilege as to the government, while maintaining the privilege against
civil litigants.158 The courts have asserted that corporations should not be
allowed to manipulate the privileges and “pick and choose” which adversaries
they are allowed to waive privilege to.159 However, upon closer inspection of
the SEC and DOJ policies, it appears that the true manipulators are the
government agencies. Moreover, the tactics that they are employing are far
more unfair than selective waiver.
Many have noted that the SEC considers “cooperation” as a major factor it
considers when investigating corporations for potential securities violations.160
An essential part of the cooperation includes whether the particular corporation
has waived privilege as to the agency.161 “At the same time, the SEC looks
very unfavorably on a perceived lack of cooperation, threatening targets of
investigations with penalties and more serious charges.”162
On October 23, 2001, the SEC released what is now known as the
“Seaboard Report.”163 The report expressed the SEC’s policy to award

McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. 18553, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8 (Del. Ch. Nov. 13, 2002), aff’d,
No. 18554, 2005 WL 583742 (Del. Mar. 8, 2005).
156. Dore, supra note 9, at 783.
157. Id. at 783–84; see Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 4, at 156 (“The possible sanctions
against the corporation if it is deemed to have failed to cooperate ‘thoroughly’ often appear too
great to justify a battle with prosecutors over privileges.”).
158. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
159. See id.
160. Dore, supra note 9, at 761; Mitchell, supra note 17, at 692.
161. Dore, supra note 9, at 761; Mitchell, supra note 17, at 692.
162. Dore, supra note 9, at 761.
163. Seaboard Report, supra note 8.
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leniency to corporations that assisted in their investigations.164 It listed several
factors as indicators of cooperation; among them is whether the corporation
voluntarily disclosed otherwise privileged information.165 Unlike previous
policies issued by the SEC, this report made clear that a perceived lack of
cooperation could result in severe penalties against a company.166 The report
also explained why the SEC did not bring charges against the Seaboard
Corporation for apparent misconduct.167 The SEC did prosecute one of the
corporate officials, but took no action against the corporation itself.168 The
SEC articulated that Seaboard’s cooperation, particularly their decision to
waive attorney-client and work-product privileges, was a factor in not
prosecuting the company.169 Therefore, due to the great advantage that can
result from waiving privilege and the significant consequences that may arise
from lack of participation, it is not hard to understand why cooperation by
companies may not be truly “voluntary.”
The DOJ has employed similar tactics. In June of 1999, Deputy Attorney
General Eric Holder, released a memorandum entitled “Bringing Criminal
Charges Against Corporations,” to the U.S. Attorneys which listed the relevant
factors that the Department should look to when determining whether to bring
criminal charges against a corporation.170 Among the factors listed was a
“corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its
willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents, including, if
necessary, the waiver of the corporate attorney-client and work product
privileges.”171 The Holder Memorandum explained that a corporation’s waiver
of privilege referred to its internal investigations and to communications
between the officers, directors, and other employees of the company.172 The
DOJ articulated that these waivers are “critical in enabling the government to

164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Dore, supra note 9, at 769–70.
167. Seaboard Report, supra note 8.
168. Id.
169. Id. Furthermore, in a footnote,
[t]he Commission then professed to “recognize that these privileges, protections and
exemptions serve important social interests,” and thus “the Commission does not view a
company’s waiver of a privilege as an end in itself, but only as a means (where necessary)
to provide relevant and sometimes critical information to the Commission staff.”
Dore, supra note 9, at 769 (quoting Seaboard Report, supra note 8).
170. Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder to All Component Heads and
United States Attorneys, Bringing Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.html [hereinafter Holder Memo]; see
also Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Reconsidering the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Response to
the Compelled-Voluntary Waiver Paradox, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 897, 935 (2006).
171. Brown, supra note 170, at 935–36 (quoting Holder Memo, supra note 170).
172. Holder Memo, supra note 170.
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evaluate the completeness of a corporation’s voluntary disclosure and
cooperation.”173 In January 2003, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson
issued a revised version of the Holder Memorandum, entitled “Principles of
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations.”174 The criteria concerning the
waiver of privileges remained in the newly revised Thompson
Memorandum.175
In a recent interview, the United States Attorney for the Southern District
of New York, James Comey, emphasized that in determining the quality of a
corporation’s cooperation, the government would consider whether the
corporation disclosed information resulting from its internal investigations and
whether it waived privilege.176 When asked about the Department’s request to
waive privilege, Comey replied that “[s]ometimes, in order to fully cooperate
and disclose all facts, a corporation will have to make some waiver because it
has gathered the facts through privileged interviews and the protected work
product of counsel.”177 Although Comey asserts that the intrusion is minimal,
he admits that waiver may be necessary if the company wants to earn leniency
through cooperation.178
The policies of these agencies are essential to this issue because fairness is
at the heart of the courts’ arguments.179 The opponents of selective waiver
have determined that it is the corporations that are being manipulative by
picking and choosing to which adversaries they waive privilege.180 However,
the policies of the agencies tell a different story. In what has been called the
“compelled-voluntary waiver paradox,”181 “[t]he government’s policy of

173. Id. The DOJ goes on to assert that “[t]he Department does not, however, consider
waiver of a corporation’s privileges an absolute requirement, and prosecutors should consider the
willingness of a corporation to waive the privileges when necessary to provide timely and
complete information as only one factor in evaluating the corporation’s cooperation.” Id.
174. Thompson Memo, supra note 7.
175. Id. There is one notable difference between the memoranda. The Thompson Memo’s
language regarding cooperation effectively increases the significance given to the waiver of
attorney-client and work-product protections. Brown, supra note 170, at 936–37; Mitchell, supra
note 17, at 695 (noting that the Thompson Memo places a “greater emphasis on waiver as a
condition of cooperation”).
176. Shirah Neiman, Corporate Fraud Issues II: Interview with United States Attorney James
B. Comey Concerning the Department of Justice’s Policy on Requesting Corporations Under
Criminal Investigation to Waive the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Protection,
1456 PLI/CORP. L. & PRAC. 1089, 1093 (2004).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Dore, supra note 9, at 784.
180. See supra Part III.A.
181. Brown, supra note 170, at 897, 899–900.
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pressuring companies to waive their attorney-client and work-product
protections is the real manipulation of the privilege.”182
“While both the SEC and DOJ insist that waiver of privilege is not
required for cooperation, corporate attorneys are aware of the well-known
incentives to cooperate with a government investigation and fear that the
corporation will be treated harshly if their cooperation is deemed
inadequate.”183 For example, with the SEC, not only does a corporation lose
the advantages of cooperation if they refuse to waive privilege, but even a
“perceived lack of cooperation” could lead to millions of dollars in losses.184
Although the agency has not penalized a corporation solely for refusal to waive
privilege, the severity of its policy essentially forces companies to waive
privilege.185 Courts have concluded that companies should not use privilege
for any “tactical employment,” yet the SEC uses the same tactical approach
“when it forces corporations to choose between the Commission’s wrath and
wholesale disclosure to suing shareholders.”186
The corporations are certainly feeling the pressure. In a recent survey of
inside and outside corporate counsel almost seventy-five percent of both
categories expressed concern that there was a culture of waiver in which
government agencies that think it is proper and reasonable to expect companies
under investigation to broadly waive their privileges.187 About fifty-two
percent of in-house counsel and fifty-nine percent of outside counsel believed
that there was a discernible increase in requests for waivers from the

182. Dore, supra note 9, at 786 (emphasis added).
183. Seeman, supra note 142, at 325; see Mitchell, supra note 17, at 696–97 (recognizing that
although the DOJ memoranda maintain that waiver is not an “absolute requirement” for
cooperation, in practice the DOJ “has made clear that waiver is an important (and at times, in fact,
required) condition to be fulfilled.” Similarly, documents from the SEC indicate that waiver may
be a necessary factor of “cooperation” with agency investigation in certain cases. “Even where
federal investigators fail to deliver formal waiver requests, corporations and their attorneys are
well aware that an assertion of attorney-client privilege or work product protection may produce
significant liabilities.”). As the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers has
articulated the “not required” aspect is hard to reconcile considering that government views a
refusal to waive privilege as an attempt to hide the truth. Robert A. Del Giorno, Corporate
Counsel As Government’s Agent: The Holder Memorandum and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307,
THE CHAMPION: NAT’L ASSOC. OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, August, 2003, at 23, available at
http://www.nacdl.org/ public.nsf/698c98dd101a846085256eb400500c01.
184. Dore, supra note 9, at 761.
185. See id.
186. Id. at 762–63. This same argument would apply to the DOJ as well since their policies
are parallel.
187. ASS’N OF CORP. COUNS., THE DECLINE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE
CORPORATE CONTEXT: SURVEY RESULTS 3 (2006), available at http://www.acc.com/Surveys/
attyclient2pdf [hereinafter ACC SURVEY]. Only one percent of inside counsel and two and a half
percent of outside counsel expressed disagreement with that opinion. Id. The survey sample
included over 1,200 respondents. Id. at 2.
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government as a condition of cooperation.188 The National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers has emphasized that “[t]he statements on
cooperation are viewed as going quite far toward effectively forcing a
corporation to waive the privileged protections in the hopes of receiving
favorable charging treatment.”189
Outside counsel indicated the DOJ
memoranda were cited most often when a reason for waiver requests was given
by the government.190 As a result of these government investigations, fifteen
percent of companies that were investigated in the last five years mentioned
that related third-party lawsuits followed.191 These results clearly indicate that
there is a significant amount of coercion as a consequence of government
policies regarding waiver. As one survey respondent explained: “Whether to
waive the privilege has not been subject to discussion; the only question is how
far the waiver will go. And, thus far, there appears to be no limit.”192
Therefore, if the courts want to look at fairness when considering selective
waiver, they should also consider the unfair procedures instituted by the
government to pressure companies into waving privilege.
Moreover, contrary to what courts have indicated, there is no unfairness to
civil litigants if selective waiver is allowed.193 As Judge Boggs correctly
pointed out in his dissent, “[i]t is important to identify the silent premise of the
court’s argument: private parties would disclose privileged material to the
government regardless of the existence of an exception.”194 Under normal
circumstances, the corporations would never be required to release the
information, and the civil litigant is in the same position that he would have
been had there been no disclosure at all.195 In other words, the court fails to
consider that the information would still be privileged if it were not released to
the government. “In the run of cases, either the government gets the disclosure
made palatable because of the exception, or neither the government nor any
private party becomes privy to the privileged material.”196
188. Id. at 3. “Consistent with that finding, roughly half of all investigations or other
inquiries experienced by survey respondents resulted in privilege waivers.” Id.
189. Del Giorno, supra note 183, at 23.
190. ACC SURVEY, supra note 187, at 4.
191. Id. Such lawsuits included private antitrust actions and derivative securities lawsuits.
Id.
192. Id. at 5. Another respondent put it more bluntly by stating that in his experience the
“government agencies routinely ‘blackmail’ companies with threats of indictment, fines, etc., in
order to get them to waive privilege and take other actions . . . .” Id. at 11.
193. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
194. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 312 (6th
Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting).
195. Id.; Seeman, supra note 142, at 338. Additionally, “the underlying facts of the
privileged communication may be available through other sources which are not privileged . . . .”
Id.
196. In re Columbia, 293 F.3d at 312 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
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Furthermore, with the fairness issue, no court has recognized the most
significant unfairness in this whole situation, that is, allowing government
agencies to enter into confidentiality agreements with corporations, only for
the courts to hold them invalid. Courts have pointed to the fact that
corporations have disclosed information to the government in the face of
virtually unanimous rejection of selective waiver;197 however, courts have
failed to emphasize that corporations have disclosed information only pursuant
to a promise by the government that their information would not be disclosed.
There is an inherent injustice in allowing one branch of government to enter
into an agreement with a party that is later invalidated by another branch,
particularly when all the repercussions of a court’s decision will fall only on
the corporation. While the courts have chastised the companies for entering
into agreements when such agreements have been invalidated by other
jurisdictions, no court has ever discussed the government’s responsibility in
entering into these agreements. Courts have expressed concern over
corporations manipulating the privileges, but—especially in the case of
confidentiality agreements—it appears that the true manipulation is coming
from the government.198 Thus, selective waiver is necessary to ensure
fairness.199
C. Public Policy Supports Approval of Selective Waiver
In addition to the fairness concerns listed above, there are formidable
policy reasons as to why selective waiver should be adopted. Even some of the
courts which have rejected selective waiver have admitted that it does
encourage corporations to cooperate with the government.200 Other courts
have denied this proposition.201 However, there is more logic on the side of
the former argument, and the policy arguments in favor of selective waiver far
outweigh its potential disadvantages.
As Judge Boggs correctly advocated in his dissent in In re Columbia,
rejecting selective waiver “unnecessarily raises the cost of cooperating with a
government investigation.”202 In explaining why selective waiver would
increase cooperation with investigations, Judge Boggs introduced what he
described as an “uncontroversial behavioral prediction”: If faced with a
complete waiver of privilege covering the entire subject matter of the

197. See, e.g., In re Qwest Communications Int’l, 450 F.3d 1179, 1193 (10th Cir. 2006).
198. See Dore, supra note 9, at 785 (“The true control, and thus the true tactical employment,
is being effected by the government, not the respective companies it chooses to investigate.”).
199. See id. at 786 (arguing that not allowing selective waiver “is an unfair exploitation of
power by the federal government that has adverse effects on both the attorney-client privilege and
work-product doctrine.”).
200. See, e.g., In re Columbia, 293 F.3d at 303.
201. See, e.g., In re Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1192.
202. 293 F.3d at 307 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
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disclosure as to all parties, the client would be more hesitant to disclose
privileged information than it would be if there was no possibility of waiver.203
This proposition is more logical than any reasoning given by courts that have
rejected the doctrine. Corporations under investigation have much to lose,
especially if faced with the possibility of a third-party suit in addition to the
consequences suffered as a result of the government investigation. Thus, it
makes sense that they would be more willing to disclose information if they
could receive favorable treatment from the government without handing a
third-party civil litigant a virtual roadmap for any subsequent lawsuit.
Selective waiver creates more of a motivation for companies to be truthful with
the information they disclose as well. “This may be best explained in the sense
that the current ‘complete waiver’ waives all privileged information to a third
party once the information is disclosed, leaving corporations with little
incentive to be completely honest when disclosing possibly incriminating
evidence.”204
The policy considerations behind the doctrine are important to analyze
because the interpretation of privileges and the determination of circumstances
under which they can be waived are bestowed to the “reason and experience”
of the federal courts.205 Thus, in applying this rule, the courts have to consider
any potential consequences and public policy concerns.206 “These questions of
‘policy,’ like the deleterious impact of a waiver rule on government
investigations, are at the heart of the privilege inquiry.”207 It should be noted
that unless the government obtains a waiver for privileged information of a
particular company, it may have no other way to obtain such information
without great expense.208 Therefore, allowing a doctrine which would
encourage voluntary waivers from companies increases the efficiency of
government investigations.209
Generally, it is true that clients should not be allowed to waive privilege as
to one adversary while maintaining it for another, but the policy behind
selective waiver overrides this concern.210 Without selective waiver, material

203. Id. at 309–10.
204. Dostart, supra note 3, at 741.
205. In re Columbia, 293 F.3d at 310 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (citing FED. R. EVID. 501).
206. Id.
207. Id.; see generally Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (extensively analyzing policy
considerations in devising a psychotherapist-patient privilege under federal law).
208. In re Columbia, 293 F.3d at 311 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
209. Id.; Brown, supra note 170, at 936 (“Such waivers permit the government to obtain
statements of possible witnesses, subjects, and targets, without having to negotiate individual
cooperation or immunity agreements.”) (citing Holder Memo, supra note 170); Dostart, supra
note 3, at 731–32.
210. Dostart, supra note 3, at 739–40.
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that could be disclosed would remain in the dark.211 So, the question at the
heart of this issue is whether the benefits obtained from prohibiting selective
waiver outweigh the benefits of the increased information that the government
would receive if the exception is allowed.212 Judge Boggs is correct in arguing
that “[a]s the harms of selective disclosure are not altogether clear, the benefits
of the increased information to the government should prevail.”213
In support of its argument that selective waiver is not needed to encourage
companies to cooperate with the government, the Tenth Circuit relied on the
fact that Qwest disclosed documents to the government in the face of nearly
unanimous rejection of the doctrine by other circuit courts.214 However, as
Judge Boggs pointed out, the case against selective waiver is not as
overwhelming as courts have suggested.215 Particularly, where disclosure has
been accompanied by confidentiality agreements (as was the case in Qwest),
several courts have shown a willingness to adopt selective waiver.216 Given
this, and considering that no Tenth Circuit case had ever addressed the issue,
this assertion by the Qwest Court is not convincing.
Moreover, the government agencies themselves have voiced support for
selective waiver as well. This is notable because in Qwest the court pointed
out that the DOJ wrote a brief at the court’s request but took no position on the
issue.217 In a January 2007 interview, Deputy United States Attorney General
Paul McNulty voiced support for the doctrine.218 He noted that the danger of
exposing companies to third-party civil lawsuits “is a significant concern,” and
he reported that the DOJ was “supportive of the effort to create a limited
waiver and to amend federal rules to allow it to occur.”219

211. In re Columbia, 293 F.3d at 312 (Boggs, J., dissenting). “The exception aids the
government in bringing violations of the law to light.” Id.
212. Id. at 311; see Dostart, supra note 3, at 739–40.
213. In re Columbia, 293 F.3d at 311 (Boggs, J., dissenting); see Dostart, supra note 3, at 740
(arguing that “a decision should not be made against the selective waiver without considering the
benefits, especially when the benefits of allowing the selective waiver have readily identifiable
strengths”).
214. In re Qwest Communications Int’l, 450 F.3d 1179, 1193 (10th Cir. 2006).
215. In re Columbia, 293 F.3d at 307 (Boggs, J., dissenting); see also Kathryn Keneally &
Kenneth M. Breen, White Collar Crime: New Life for Selective Waiver, THE CHAMPION:
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, Jan.–Feb. 2006, at 42 (commenting
that recent court decisions have given new hope for selective waiver).
216. Keneally & Breen, supra note 215, at 42; see also In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d
230, 236 (2nd Cir. 1993); In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
217. In re Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1193.
218. Pamela A. MacLean, No Comfort from DOJ Waiver Rule: “McNulty Memo” on
Attorney-Client Privilege Blasted by Critics, 29 NAT’L L.J. No. 20, Jan. 22, 2007, at 8.
219. Id.
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Furthermore, the SEC has asserted that waiver of privilege greatly
enhances investigative efforts.220 In an amicus brief filed with the Ninth
Circuit, the SEC argued that confidentiality agreements should preserve
privilege against third-party civil litigants.221 Relying significantly on Judge
Boggs’s dissent in In re Columbia, the SEC argued that “[a]llowing parties to
produce work product to the Commission without waiving work-product
protection serves the public interest because it significantly enhances the
Commission’s ability to conduct expeditious investigations and obtain prompt
relief . . . .”222
D. Future of Selective Waiver
Given the importance of the issue as well as the changing landscape in
regards to corporate corruption, selective waiver is an issue that is likely to
come before even more circuits. The recent wave of court decisions rejecting
selective waiver suggest that it is unlikely that these remaining circuits will
wholeheartedly accept the doctrine. However, there is some evidence to
suggest that courts may be willing to adopt some form of selective waiver
where a confidentiality agreement was executed between the companies and
the government.223
The best hope for corporations will most likely come from the legislature.
Recent legislation proposed by Congress strongly supports corporations.
Congress is calling for a new Federal Rule of Evidence which would resolve
the circuit split in favor of the companies.224 Proposed Federal Rule of
Evidence 502 would allow selective waiver, such that disclosure to a federal
agency would not affect waiver to third parties when the corporation has
executed a confidentiality agreement with the government.225 In addition, on
December 7, 2006, Senator Arlen Specter introduced the “Attorney-Client
Privilege Protection Act of 2006.”226 The proposed law would trump the DOJ
memoranda and make it illegal for any governmental agency to use waiver of
privilege to determine the level of cooperation for companies under
investigation.227 Senator Specter took the lead in this area because the DOJ
220. Dostart, supra note 3, at 740–41 & n. 126.
221. Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Appellants at 24, United States v. Bergonzi, 403 F.3d 1048, (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 03-10511).
222. Id. at 23–24.
223. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
224. Geogory P. Joseph, Privilege Waiver Rule I, 28 NAT’L L.J. No. 35, May 8, 2006, at 15.
225. Id.
226. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S.318, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced
in the Senate on Jan. 4, 2007); see Press Release, Assoc. of Corporate Counsel, Senator Specter
Takes Aim at DOJ’s “Thompson Memorandum” (Dec. 7, 2006), available at
http://www.acc.com/about/press/item.php?key=20061207_6468 [hereinafter Press Release].
227. Press Release, supra note 226. The Association for Corporate Counsel has spoken in
support of this bill, declaring that “[they] commend Senator Specter for recognizing that the
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was not forthcoming with reforms of its own.228 Due to the drastic
consequences that this Act would have for government investigations, there
may be a greater call for selective waiver as a middle ground when there is a
confidentiality agreement; allowing companies to voluntarily aid in
government investigations without suffering severe repercussions as to later
civil suits.
CONCLUSION
As corporate scandals continue to arise, there will be an ever-increasing
call for corporations to cooperate with the government. In most cases, this will
require that corporations disclose otherwise privileged information. The
choice that companies must make carries grave consequences. Corporations
have a strong incentive to cooperate with the government, but the cost of that
cooperation is increasing as courts continue to give third-party civil litigants
access to disclosed information. Selective waiver should be allowed when a
corporation has entered into a confidentiality agreement with the government
because the doctrine does promote the goals of the attorney-client and workproduct privileges, and the public policy benefits resulting from selective
waiver greatly outweigh any potential disadvantages. Government policies
concerning waiver essentially force corporations to disclose their privileged
information. Court rulings further exacerbate the problem by invalidating
promises made by the government to ensure that corporations will not have to
turn over their information to third parties. Therefore, allowing a selective
waiver when a government agency has entered into a confidentiality agreement
with a corporation is the only way to ensure that what appears to be
cooperation is not really coercion.
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Department of Justice has gone too far in the tactics it employs during the prosecutorial process.”
Id.
228. Id. While the Association of Corporate Counsel has voiced support for Senator
Specter’s bill, they have not endorsed Proposed Federal Rule 502. Press Release, Assoc. of
Corporate Counsel, “Selective Waivers” Offer Wrong Protection to Corporations, available at
http://www.acc.com/about/press/item.php?key=20070130_21487. It describes the bill as “a wolf
in sheep’s clothing” and purports that it will facilitate prosecutorial demands for waiver. Id.
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